THE STATE OF

ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA

The Complex Relationships among Faith, Theology, Politics and Everyday Regard

A study by NRB
in partnership with Back to the Bible's Center for Scripture Absorption

Arnie Cole, Ed.D.
Director, Center for Scripture Absorption · CEO, Back to the Bible
Lincoln, Nebraska · October 2026
White paper · N = 3,926 U.S. adults

Contents

Contents....1
Executive Summary....2
Key Takeaways....4
Predictive Analytics....6
Model 1: Antisemitism as a serious problem in the United States....6
Model 2: Antisemitism as a serious problem in evangelical or born-again circles....7
Model 3: Christians should share the Gospel with Jewish people so they can become Christians....10
Reading across the three models....10
The Study....12
Background and purpose....12
Method....12
Sample characteristics....13
Findings 1: Where Americans get their views, and what they have heard....15
Findings 2: Theology by religious identification....15
Findings 3: Historical reckoning and church climate....18
Findings 4: Stereotypes, everyday regard and separation....19
Findings 5: Views of Israeli policy....20
Findings 6: Exposure to negative comments....22
Findings 7: Perceived seriousness of antisemitism....22
Findings 8: Spiritual growth stage....23
Limitations....27
Lit Review: Executive Summary....30
Lit Review: Key Takeaways....30
Why This Matters: The Mental-Health Cost of Antisemitism....32
The Evangelical Record: Addressed and Perpetuated....34
Can We Even Measure This? The State of the Instruments....36
The Blueprint: Building a Better Instrument....37
Conclusion: The Lit Review Against the Findings....40
Claim by claim....40
The five domains, one at a time....41
Where the two bodies of evidence leave us....41
References....43

Executive Summary

More than three-fifths (62%) of American adults say antisemitism is a serious problem in the United States. Only 39% say it is a serious problem inside evangelical and born-again circles, and nearly a quarter cannot say either way. That gap is the headline of this study, and it is the gap the Church needs to close first.




Figure 1. Two-thirds of U.S. adults see antisemitism as a serious national problem; 39% see it as serious in evangelical or born-again circles.

NRB commissioned this study from the Center for Scripture Absorption at Back to the Bible, who fielded an online panel survey of 3,926 U.S. adults, stratified by age and gender and weighted to the U.S. population. Of those, a weighted 2,245 identify as Christian, which gives us the statistical power to compare born-again Christians, other Christians, adherents of other religions, the spiritual-but-not-religious, and the neither-spiritual-nor-religious on the same items.

The instrument measures nine dimensions:

1) Endorsement of antisemitic stereotypes and conspiracy beliefs
2) Everyday regard toward Jewish people
3) Theology related to Jewish people (covenant, land, evangelism, rejection, prophecy),
4) Willingness to reckon with the Christian Church's historical antisemitism
5) Perceived church climate
6) Information sources

7) Exposure to negative comments in secular and in Christian settings
8) Views of Israeli policy
9) The ability to separate views of Jewish people from views of the Israeli government.

Several constructs are multi-item scales. Respondents utilized a 5-point scale for most items from 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree, unless otherwise noted.

What the descriptives show. Everyday regard toward Jewish people is high across every group (total mean 3.84). Rejection of antisemitic stereotypes is only moderate (total mean 3.25), and born-again respondents score lowest on it (3.16). Born-again Christians differ from everyone else, with large effect sizes, on two theological items: that Christians should share the Gospel with Jewish people so they become Christians (3.71 versus a total mean of 2.99) and that their view of Israel is shaped more by biblical prophecy than by current events (3.51 versus 2.93). They score highest on Israel's legitimacy (3.83) and on the land promise and covenant items. They are also slightly more likely than other groups to say God has rejected the Jewish people, though most do not believe that. On whether the Church should reckon with its antisemitic past, and whether Christians have a biblical responsibility to oppose anti-Jewish prejudice, there is no meaningful difference between groups.

What the models show. Multiple regression models reveal significant predictors of recognizing antisemitism as a problem and agreement with an evangelical approach to Jewish people. Recognizing antisemitism as a serious U.S. problem is explained by hearing negative comments in the news, support for historical reckoning, and rejection of antisemitic views (R = .408, about 16% of variance). Recognizing it as a problem in evangelical circles is driven most by hearing negative comments in church, Bible study or Christian media, and by support for historical reckoning; identifying as Christian predicts seeing less of a problem (R = .313 to .408). Agreement that Christians should evangelize Jewish people is the best-explained outcome in the study (R = .608, 36% of variance), and its strongest predictor is the belief that God has rejected the Jewish people.

What it means. Born-again identification is not, by itself, a predictor of antisemitism, and it is not a predictor of recognizing antisemitism either. The theology underneath the identification is what moves the numbers. Supersessionist belief, conversion posture and prophecy-driven views of Israel travel together, and they coexist with high regard for Jewish neighbors and the strongest pro-Israel sentiment in the sample. Loving Israel and loving Jewish people are measurably different variables. A Church that wants to oppose antisemitism in its own house must measure both, and this study is the first instrument built to do that.

Key Takeaways

1. **Americans see the problem nationally but not in the Church.** Sixty-two percent call antisemitism a somewhat or very serious U.S. problem and 59% say it has grown in five years. For evangelical and born-again circles the figures drop to 39% and 37%, with 23% saying they do not know. The two perceptions are strongly correlated (r = .441): people who see it in the country tend to see it in the Church, and people who do not, do not.
2. **Everyday regard is high; stereotype rejection is only moderate.** The gap between the regard scale (3.84) and the stereotype-rejection scale (3.25) is the clearest evidence in the data that warmth toward Jewish people and freedom from antisemitic tropes are separate things. Born-again respondents post the lowest stereotype-rejection score of any group (3.16).
3. **Born-again theology is the sharpest divider in the sample.** The two largest effect sizes in the study are both theological: born-again respondents endorse evangelizing Jewish people (3.71 vs. 2.99) and prophecy-shaped views of Israel (3.51 vs. 2.93). Medium effects follow on the land promise, God's covenant purpose for the Jewish people, and reliance on sermons and Christian media for what they know about Jewish people.
4. **Rejection theology is the engine of conversion posture.** Belief that God has rejected the Jewish people is the single strongest predictor of agreement that Christians should evangelize them, in a model explaining 36% of the variance. Born-again respondents are the only group whose mean on the "God hasn't rejected" scale falls below the total (3.18 vs. 3.49), though the majority still reject rejection.
5. **Pro-Israel is not pro-Jewish.** Born-again Christians are the most pro-Israel group on legitimacy (3.83), on justified self-defense after October 7 (3.47), and on comfort with Israel supporters (3.78). They are the least likely to reject stereotypes. The two move independently, exactly as the literature review predicted.
6. **Exposure drives recognition, and the source matters.** Hearing negative comments in the news predicts seeing antisemitism as a U.S. problem (β = .158). Hearing them in church, Bible study or Christian media predicts seeing it as a Church problem (β = .188) and is the strongest predictor in that model. Born-again respondents report the most exposure in Christian settings of any Christian group (2.33 on a 1–5 frequency scale).
7. **Historical reckoning is the one belief that predicts everything.** Support for the Church acknowledging its antisemitic past predicts recognizing antisemitism in the U.S. (β = .155), in the Church (β = .160), and, counter-intuitively, greater support for evangelizing Jewish people. It is also the item on which groups do not differ. It is the common ground, and it is the lever.
8. **Identifying as Christian predicts not seeing the problem in the Church.** Net of theology and exposure, Christian identification carries a negative coefficient (β = −.126) on recognizing antisemitism in evangelical circles. The people best positioned to see it are the least likely to do so.
9. **Demographics explain almost nothing.** Gender and age reach significance but demographic-only models explain 3–4% of variance (R = .17 to .20). Political affiliation does

not predict seeing antisemitism as a U.S. problem at all. Beliefs, regard and exposure do the work.

10. **News is the dominant information source.** Of 2,745 coded open-ended responses, 33% name the news as their primary influence on views of Jewish people and Israel, 22% social media or the internet, 18% the Bible or church, 12% personal connections, and 9% Jewish people themselves. The Church is shaping these views for fewer than one in five Americans.
11. **Scripture engagement raises covenant and regard but leaves rejection theology untouched.** Sorted by SALT spiritual stage, mature believers and disciple-makers hold the highest view of God's covenant with the Jewish people (4.02 vs. 3.29 among non-believers, medium effect) and the warmest everyday regard on every item. Coded tropes fall with maturity but plateau. Belief that God has rejected the Jewish people does not move across stages (2.40, 2.18, 2.32), and neither does agreement that the Church should acknowledge its own historical role (3.49, 3.42, 3.49). The lit review's Power of 4 hypothesis is supported on love and covenant and not supported on supersessionism.

Predictive Analytics

The three outcomes modeled here are (1) how serious a problem antisemitism is in the United States today, (2) how serious a problem it is in evangelical or born-again circles today, and (3) agreement that Christians should share the Gospel with Jewish people so they can become Christians. All models are ordinary least squares multiple regressions with standardized coefficients (β). R is the multiple correlation; R^2 is the share of variance explained. Significance: *p < .05, p < .01,* ** p < .001. For each outcome a demographic-only baseline was run first, then a full model adding attitudinal scales. For the Church outcome a third model substitutes individual items for scales.

A note on magnitude before the tables. R^2 values of .10 to .16 are typical for attitude research with single-item outcomes; they are not evidence of weak models but of outcomes with many causes. The evangelism model at R^2 = .36 is unusually strong for survey data and should be read as a theological construct with a tight, identifiable structure.




Figure 2. Variance explained (R^2) by demographic-only and full attitudinal models for each outcome.

Model 1: Antisemitism as a serious problem in the United States

Demographic baseline. Women and older adults are more likely to see antisemitism as a serious U.S. problem. Born-again/Evangelical identification, Christian identification and political affiliation have no effect. R = .201, $R^2 \approx .04$.

Full model. R = .408, $R^2 \approx .16$.

Predictor	β	Sig.
Hearing negative comments in the news or other media	.158	***
Believing there should be a historical reckoning in the church	.155	***
Rejecting antisemitism (stereotype/conspiracy scale)	.133	***
Seeing Israel as legitimate	.080	***
Positive everyday regard for Jewish people	.068	**
Believing God has not rejected the Jewish people	.063	***
Older age	.044	*
Male	−.055	***




Figure 3. Standardized coefficients predicting recognition of antisemitism as a serious U.S. problem.

The three largest coefficients are exposure, reckoning and rejection of antisemitism, in a near tie. Demographics survive but shrink. Neither religious identification nor politics enters the full model. Recognition of antisemitism nationally is a function of what people have heard, what they believe the Church owes history, and whether they themselves hold antisemitic beliefs. It is not a function of being evangelical, Christian, Republican or Democrat.

Model 2: Antisemitism as a serious problem in evangelical or born-again circles

Demographic baseline. Women, younger people, non-Christians and more politically liberal respondents are more likely to see antisemitism as a problem in evangelical circles. R = .171, $R^2 \approx .03$.

Full model with scales. R = .313, $R^2 \approx .10$.

Predictor	β	Sig.
Hearing negative comments in church, Bible study or Christian media	.188	***
Believing there should be a historical reckoning in the church	.160	***
Identifying as Christian	−.126	***
Positive everyday regard for Jewish people	.072	**
More liberal political views	.070	***
Age (older)	−.051	*
Hearing negative comments in the news or other media	−.050	*




Figure 4. Standardized coefficients predicting recognition of antisemitism as a serious problem in evangelical or born-again circles (scale-level model).

Two things stand out. First, the source of exposure flips. Secular media exposure predicts seeing the national problem; Christian-setting exposure predicts seeing the Church problem, and secular exposure actually carries a small negative sign here. People who hear it in the pews believe it is in the pews. Second, Christian identification is the third-strongest predictor and it is negative. Insiders are less likely to see a problem inside.

Item-level model. Substituting individual items for scales raises explanatory power to R = .408, R^2 ≈ .16. The items that enter:

Item	β
The Christian church should honestly acknowledge its role in the historical mistreatment of Jewish people	.170
Understanding the history of Christian antisemitism is important for Christians today	.137
Christians should share the Gospel with Jewish people so they can become Christians	−.119

Item	β
Israel's actions in Gaza constitute genocide	.115
Identifies as a Christian	−.089
How old are you?	−.086
In the churches or Christian settings I know best, Jewish people are usually spoken about with respect	−.080
I am comfortable spending time with Jewish people	−.075
Compared to other groups, Jewish people have too much power in the media	−.071
Jewish people can be trusted just as much as other cultures in business	.068
Israel makes a positive contribution to the world	.067
Israel is denying Palestinians the right to govern their own country	.067
Jewish people don't need to convert to Christianity because they are God's chosen people	.066
My view of Israel is shaped more by biblical prophecy than by current events	.053




Figure 5. Item-level predictors of recognizing antisemitism in evangelical circles. Navy bars predict more recognition; grey bars predict less.

The two historical-reckoning items are the top predictors. Conversion posture runs the other way: people who believe Jewish people should be evangelized are less likely to see antisemitism in the Church, and people who believe Jewish people do not need to convert are more likely to. The Israel items split: seeing Gaza as genocide and seeing Palestinian self-governance denied both predict seeing a Church problem, but so does believing Israel contributes positively to the world. Recognizing antisemitism in evangelical circles is not a proxy for anti-Israel sentiment. Lower comfort with Jewish people and lower reports of respectful church talk also predict recognition, which suggests part of what drives it is firsthand experience of a cold climate.

Model 3: Christians should share the Gospel with Jewish people so they can become Christians

R = .608, $R^2 \approx .36$. This is the best-explained outcome in the study.

Direction	Predictor
More agreement	Believes God has rejected the Jewish people
More agreement	Identifies as evangelical or born-again
More agreement	Believes in Israel's legitimacy
More agreement	Identifies as Christian
More agreement	More politically conservative
More agreement	Believes there should be a historical reckoning in the Church
Less agreement	Older age
Less agreement	Less warm regard for Jewish people
Less agreement	More endorsement of antisemitic beliefs
Less agreement	Heard fewer negative comments about Jewish people in the news or other media

The structure here matters more than any single coefficient. Conversion posture is predicted by rejection theology first and by born-again identity second. It is also predicted by pro-Israel views, conservative politics and, notably, by support for historical reckoning. On the other side, it is predicted by warm regard and by rejecting antisemitism. In plain terms: the people most committed to evangelizing Jewish people are not the people who hold them in contempt. They are the people who hold a high view of Israel, a supersessionist view of the covenant, and a sincere wish for the Church to face its past. That combination is theologically coherent and it is exactly the profile the lit review flagged as the evangelical blind spot: a conversion-only posture that treats Jewish faith as incomplete, held by people who would be shocked to be called antisemitic and who, on the regard and stereotype measures, mostly are not.

Reading across the three models

	U.S. problem	Church problem	Evangelize
R^2	.16	.10 / .16	.36
Born-again identification	no effect	no effect (scales)	positive
Christian identification	no effect	negative	positive
Political affiliation	no effect	liberal positive	conservative positive
Historical reckoning	positive	positive	positive
Everyday regard	positive	positive	positive
Rejecting antisemitism	positive	item-level: mixed	positive
Exposure in news	positive	negative	positive
Exposure in church	not in model	positive	not in model
Rejection theology	negative	not in model	positive

	U.S. problem	Church problem	Evangelize
Age	older positive	younger positive	younger positive
Gender	female positive	female positive (baseline)	not in model

Historical reckoning and everyday regard are positive in all three models. They are the only predictors with that property. Religious identification and politics are inconsistent: silent on the national question, directional on the Church question, and strongly directional on evangelism. The conclusion is not that evangelicals are more or less antisemitic. It is that the theology evangelicals hold, not the label they wear, determines where they land.

The Study

Background and purpose

This study is the first field test of the instrument blueprint laid out in the lit review, which is presented in full in Part II of this paper. That review of 21 peer-reviewed sources found that antisemitic experience reliably predicts depression, anxiety, stress and PTSD among Jewish Americans; that the American evangelical record on antisemitism is genuinely mixed; and that no existing instrument measures Christian attitudes toward the Jewish people across the domains that matter, with none validated for the evangelical context. The blueprint called for five separately scored domains: covenantal affirmation, everyday regard, coded-trope susceptibility, conversion posture and historical reckoning. The survey reported here operationalizes those domains, adds exposure, information sources and Israeli policy views, and fields them to a national sample large enough to compare religious groups.

The study's purpose is diagnostic. It does not test an intervention. It establishes where American adults, and American Christians in particular, stand on these constructs, and it identifies which beliefs and experiences predict recognition of antisemitism and conversion posture toward Jewish people.

Method

Design and sample. Cross-sectional online panel survey. N = 3,926 complete responses, stratified by age and gender. Descriptive statistics for the total sample use weights to correct the stratified sample to U.S. population proportions. Group comparisons use the unweighted analytic sample.

Religious identification. Respondents self-classified into five groups: born-again or evangelical Christian; Christian but not born-again; other religion; spiritual but not religious; and neither spiritual nor religious. The combined Christian group is a weighted n of 2,245.

Measures. Nine constructs, measured by single items or multi-item scales on five-point Likert agreement scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) unless noted. Exposure items use a five-point frequency scale (1 = never, 5 = very often). Perceived seriousness of antisemitism in the U.S. and in evangelical circles use categorical seriousness and five-year change items. Two open-ended items were coded by hand: what sources influence the respondent's views of Jewish people and Israel, and what the respondent has heard said about Jewish people.

Construct	Form
Antisemitic stereotypes and conspiracy beliefs	Multi-item scale, scored as rejection
Everyday regard toward Jewish people	Multi-item scale
Theology: God has not rejected the Jewish people	Multi-item scale
Theology: land promise, covenant purpose, evangelism, prophecy, no need to convert, same as covenant people	Single items

Construct	Form
Historical reckoning with Christian antisemitism	Four-item scale
Church climate: respect, Christian sources of knowledge, responsibility to oppose prejudice	Single items
Israel legitimacy and positive evaluation	Multi-item scale
Israeli policy: self-defense after 10/7, genocide, Palestinian self-governance	Single items
Separating views of Jewish people from the Israeli government	Single item; one reversed item on Israeli actions excusing negative views
Exposure to negative comments: news/media; church/Bible study/Christian media	Two frequency items
Perceived seriousness and five-year change: U.S.; evangelical circles	Four items
Information sources; what respondents have heard	Two open-ended items, coded

Analysis. Weighted descriptives for the total sample. One-way comparisons across the five religious groups (unweighted) with effect sizes reported alongside significance; given n ≈ 3,900, nearly every difference is statistically significant, so the paper reports only medium and large effects as meaningful and flags small effects as such. Three outcomes modeled by multiple regression (unweighted), each with a demographic baseline and a full attitudinal model, reported above.

Sample characteristics

The sample is balanced by gender (1,987 women, 1,912 men, 13 other) and spread across age bands from 18–24 (461) to 65 and over (861). Education skews to the middle: 25% high school, 28% some college or associate degree, 26% bachelor's, 16% graduate or professional degree, 3% less than high school. Political affiliation is 31% Republican, 35% Democrat, 26% Independent, 4% something else, 4% declined.




Figure 6. Age-by-gender counts and political affiliation of the sample.

Among the weighted Christian subsample (n ≈ 2,245), roughly 29% are Catholic, 29% evangelical or born-again in non-denominational or independent churches, 12% other Protestant, 12% Southern Baptist, with smaller shares Pentecostal or Charismatic, Orthodox, and other. Church attendance is bimodal: about 29% attend weekly or more and about 42% rarely or never. Bible study or small group participation runs lower than attendance.




Figure 7. Approximate denominational composition of the weighted Christian subsample (n ≈ 2,245).

Findings 1: Where Americans get their views, and what they have heard

2,745 respondents answered the open-ended question on what sources shape their views of Jewish people and Israel. News is the most-named source at 33%. Social media, media generally or the internet follow at 22%. The Bible or church is third at 18%. Personal connections (family, friends, co-workers) account for 12%, and 9% say Jewish people themselves are their primary source.




Figure 8. Primary source shaping views of Jewish people and Israel, from 2,745 coded open-ended responses.

1,152 responses to what respondents have heard about Jewish people could be coded. Most are general: "negative things," "antisemitic stereotypes." Specific negative descriptors that recur are "greedy," "cruel," "controlling" and "not trustworthy." A substantial share of responses instead report respectful framing from church settings, most often that Jewish people are God's chosen people.

The implication for a Christian broadcaster is direct. The Church is the primary shaper of these views for fewer than one in five Americans, and news plus social media together account for more than half. Whatever the Church teaches about the Jewish people competes with a far larger stream of secular content, and the regression models show that secular news exposure, not church teaching, is what drives recognition of antisemitism nationally.

Findings 2: Theology by religious identification

Theology is where the groups separate. The table reports means on 1–5 agreement scales. Every difference is statistically significant; asterisks mark effect size (*medium,* * large). Unmarked rows are small effects and should not be read as meaningful group differences.

Item or scale	Total	Born again	Christian	Other religion	Spiritual, not religious	Not spiritual or religious
God hasn't rejected Jewish people (scale)*	3.49	3.18	3.60	3.63	3.66	3.66
Jewish people today are the same as the covenant people in the Bible	2.77	2.77	2.79	3.09	2.70	2.76
God promised the land of Israel to the Jewish people*	3.31	3.69	3.39	3.34	3.04	2.80
Christians should share the Gospel with the Jewish people**	2.99	3.71	2.97	2.59	2.52	2.39
Jewish people don't need to convert because they are God's chosen people	3.06	2.97	3.13	3.40	3.08	3.00
God has a covenant or special purpose for the Jewish people*	3.47	3.83	3.57	3.53	3.23	2.93
My view of Israel is shaped more by biblical prophecy than by current events**	2.93	3.51	2.98	2.75	2.51	2.31




Figure 9. The two large-effect theological items by religious identification.




Figure 10. Medium-effect theological items. Born-again respondents score highest on covenant and land promise and lowest on the not-rejected scale.

Three observations are especially important in these data.

First, the two large effects are both born-again signatures. Evangelism (3.71) and prophecy-shaped views of Israel (3.51) separate born-again respondents from every other group, including other Christians, who sit at or near the total mean on both. The non-born-again Christian group is theologically closer to the other-religion and spiritual-not-religious groups than to born-again Christians.

Second, the "God hasn't rejected" scale is the only item where born-again respondents score below every other group. Their mean of 3.18 is still above the midpoint, so most born-again respondents do not endorse rejection. But a mean of 3.18 against 3.60 to 3.66 everywhere else means a meaningful minority do, and the regression work shows that this minority is the core of conversion posture.

Third, born-again respondents hold the highest view of God's covenant purpose (3.83) and the land promise (3.69) in the sample. High covenantal affirmation and elevated rejection theology coexist in the same group. That is not a contradiction in the data; it is a recognizable eschatological position in which Israel's national destiny and Jewish individuals' spiritual standing are treated as separate questions.

Findings 3: Historical reckoning and church climate

Item or scale	Total	Born again	Christian	Other religion	Spiritual, not religious	Not spiritual or religious
Historical reckoning with Christian antisemitism (scale)	3.60	3.70	3.61	3.64	3.53	3.39
Christians have a biblical responsibility to oppose anti-Jewish prejudice	3.35	3.59	3.36	3.41	3.23	3.04
In the churches or Christian settings I know best, Jewish people are usually spoken about with respect*	3.57	3.75	3.75	3.35	3.43	3.23
Most of what I know about Jewish people comes from sermons, Bible teaching, or Christian media*	2.98	3.45	3.05	2.66	2.68	2.47




Figure 11. Historical reckoning and church-climate items by religious identification.

The four-item reckoning scale (understanding the history of Christian antisemitism matters; the Church should acknowledge its role in historical mistreatment; looking critically at Christian history helps the Church reflect its values; remembering historical injustice is part of faithful witness) draws agreement across every group, with born-again respondents highest at 3.70. The differences are small and not meaningful. The same holds for biblical responsibility to oppose anti-Jewish prejudice, where born-again respondents again lead at 3.59.

This is the most hopeful finding in the study. The constituency most exposed to conversion theology and prophecy-driven views of Israel is also the constituency most willing to say the

Church should face its past. The regression models confirm that this willingness is the single most consistent predictor of recognizing antisemitism, nationally and in the Church.

Church climate shows medium effects. Both Christian groups report that Jewish people are spoken of with respect in their settings (3.75) and born-again respondents in particular say most of what they know about Jewish people comes from sermons, Bible teaching or Christian media (3.45). For nearly half of born-again Christians, the pulpit is the primary source of their picture of the Jewish people. That is a responsibility and it is an opportunity.

Findings 4: Stereotypes, everyday regard and separation

Item or scale	Total	Born again	Christian	Other religion	Spiritual, not religious	Not spiritual or religious
Rejects antisemitic stereotypes and conspiracy beliefs (scale)	3.25	3.16	3.38	3.39	3.27	3.20
High everyday regard toward Jewish people (scale)	3.84	3.83	3.92	3.86	3.87	3.72
Negative actions by the State of Israel can make negative views of Jewish people seem more understandable (reversed)	2.88	2.75	2.90	2.96	2.92	3.01




Figure 12. Everyday regard is high in every group; rejection of antisemitic stereotypes sits only modestly above neutral.

All differences here are small effects. The important numbers are the levels, not the gaps.

Everyday regard is high and flat: 3.72 to 3.92 across every group. Americans of every religious disposition report warmth toward Jewish people in ordinary life.

Stereotype rejection is a different story. The total mean of 3.25 sits only a quarter-point above neutral. That means endorsement of antisemitic stereotypes and conspiracy beliefs is moderate, not rare, across the American public. Born-again respondents post the lowest rejection score (3.16), non-born-again Christians and other-religion respondents the highest (3.38, 3.39). The half-point gap between regard and stereotype rejection in every group is the empirical version of the lit review's warning that loving Israel, or being warm to a Jewish neighbor, is not the same as being free of antisemitic ideas.

The reversed item on Israeli actions making negative views of Jewish people understandable sits near 2.9 across groups, with born-again respondents lowest at 2.75. Read in the reversed direction, born-again respondents are slightly more willing than others to say that negative views of Jewish people become more understandable when Israel acts badly. That is a small effect, but it is in the direction the coded-trope literature would predict and it is worth watching in follow-up work.

Findings 5: Views of Israeli policy

Item or scale	Total	Born again	Christian	Other religion	Spiritual, not religious	Not spiritual or religious
Israel legitimacy and positive evaluation (scale)	3.67	3.83	3.75	3.63	3.58	3.37
Comfortable spending time with people who openly support Israel	3.56	3.78	3.68	3.51	3.44	3.15
Can separate my view of Jewish people from my view of the Israeli government	3.78	3.72	3.79	3.82	3.88	3.74
Israel's military response after 10/7/23 attacks was justified self-defense	3.23	3.47	3.32	3.40	2.98	2.89
Israel's actions in Gaza constitute genocide	3.20	3.13	3.06	3.12	3.31	3.42
Israel is denying Palestinians the right to govern their own country	3.28	3.21	3.16	3.16	3.39	3.51




Figure 13. Israel policy items by religious identification. Born-again respondents anchor the pro-Israel end on every item except separation of Jewish people from the Israeli government.

All differences are small effects. Born-again respondents are the most pro-Israel group on legitimacy (3.83), on comfort with Israel supporters (3.78) and on justified self-defense (3.47), and the least likely to call Gaza genocide (3.13) or to say Israel denies Palestinian self-governance (3.21). The non-religious group is the mirror image on every item. The gradient runs cleanly from born-again through Christian and other religion to spiritual-not-religious and not-religious.

The public is divided about Gaza. Justified self-defense (3.23) and genocide (3.20) both sit just above neutral in the total sample, and the two are not mutually exclusive in respondents' minds. The ability to separate views of Jewish people from the Israeli government is high everywhere (3.72 to 3.88) and does not vary meaningfully by group. Americans say they make the distinction. The regard scale suggests they largely do. The stereotype scale suggests the distinction is not complete.

Findings 6: Exposure to negative comments

Item (1 = never, 5 = very often)	Total	Born again	Christian	Other religion	Spiritual, not religious	Not spiritual or religious
Past 12 months: negative comments about Jewish people in the news or other media	2.91	2.98	2.89	3.15	2.89	2.72
Past 12 months: negative comments about Jews in church, Bible study, or Christian media	2.07	2.33	1.94	2.35	1.92	1.84




Figure 14. Frequency of hearing negative comments about Jewish people in secular media and in Christian settings, past 12 months.

Exposure in news and media is moderate (2.91) and roughly flat across groups. Exposure in Christian settings is low (2.07) but not zero, and it is highest among born-again respondents (2.33) and other-religion respondents (2.35), who presumably encounter Christian media from outside. Non-born-again Christians report less (1.94). On this item born-again Christians are reporting more negative talk about Jews in their own religious spaces than other Christians are. Given that Christian-setting exposure is the strongest single predictor of recognizing antisemitism in the Church (β = .188), the people who hear it are, to their credit, the people who name it.

Findings 7: Perceived seriousness of antisemitism

More than three-fifths (62%) of U.S. adults say antisemitism is a somewhat or very serious problem in the United States today, and 59% say it has increased over the past five years (Figure 1).

For evangelical or born-again circles, 39% say it is a somewhat or very serious problem and 37% say it has increased over five years. A significant minority (23%) say they do not know or have no opinion. The perception that antisemitism is a national problem and the perception that it is a Church problem are strongly correlated.

The gap between 62% and 39% has three plausible readings and the data do not fully adjudicate among them. One: antisemitism is in fact less prevalent in evangelical circles than in the general population, and respondents accurately perceive this. Two: respondents, most of whom are not evangelical, lack the exposure to judge, which the 22.8% don't-know rate and the predictive role of Christian-setting exposure both support. Three: Christian respondents under-recognize what is in their own house, which the negative coefficient on Christian identification supports. The item-level model's finding that reports of respectful church talk predict less recognition is consistent with either the first or the third reading. Follow-up work with a larger evangelical oversample, and with behavioral rather than perceptual items, is needed to settle it.

Findings 8: Spiritual growth stage

The lit review closed with one hypothesis stated so the data could prove it wrong: the people most deeply in the Word should look the least like the prejudice. This survey did not carry the full SALT Index, but it did carry enough to sort respondents into SALT spiritual growth stages. P1 is non-believers and the spiritually uncertain (n = 2,799, 72% of the sample). P2 is professing believers with limited engagement or confidence (n = 634, 16%). P3 and P4, mature believers and active disciple-makers, are combined here because of cell size (n = 459, 12%). Means are unweighted. Effect sizes are eta-squared computed from group means and standard deviations, read on the usual thresholds: .01 small, .06 medium, .14 large.

The answer is a partial yes, and the part that is no is the most useful finding in this section.

Covenantal affirmation rises with maturity. These are the two largest stage effects outside conversion posture. Agreement that God has an ongoing covenant or special purpose for the Jewish people climbs from 3.29 at P1 to 3.73 at P2 to 4.02 at P3/P4 ($\eta^2 = .065$, medium). The land promise climbs from 3.14 to 3.55 to 3.86 ($\eta^2 = .059$, borderline medium). Mature believers hold the highest view of the covenant in the sample, exactly as the hypothesis predicted.

Everyday regard rises with maturity, modestly. Every regard item moves in the predicted direction and every effect is small. Comfort spending time with Jewish people rises from 3.93 to 4.24; welcoming a Jewish person into one's circle of close friends from 3.92 to 4.21; trusting Jewish people in business from 3.79 to 4.09; seeing Jewish Americans as equally loyal from 3.75 to 3.99. The warmest group in the study toward Jewish people, on every regard item, is the group most engaged with Scripture.

Coded tropes fall, then plateau. Agreement that Israel's supporters are a bad influence on democracy drops from 2.88 at P1 to 2.44 at P3/P4 ($\eta^2 = .022$). Agreement that Israel can get away with anything because its supporters control the media drops from 2.80 to 2.53, but the drop

happens between P1 and P2 and reverses slightly at P3/P4 (2.44 to 2.53). The oldest trope of all, that Jewish people have too much power in the media, barely moves: 2.80, 2.59, 2.66 (η^2 = .005). Maturity lowers trope susceptibility, but most of the gain comes at the first step into belief, and the most mature group gives some of it back.

Rejection theology does not move at all. This is the finding the hypothesis did not anticipate. Belief that God has rejected the Jewish people because they rejected Jesus sits at 2.40 for P1, 2.18 for P2 and 2.32 for P3/P4 (η^2 = .005). Belief that the Church has replaced Israel in God's plan is flat at 2.77, 2.69, 2.82. Belief that Jewish people today bear responsibility for the death of Jesus is flat at 2.49, 2.41, 2.64, with the mature group slightly highest. Scripture engagement raises covenantal affirmation by three-quarters of a point and leaves supersessionist belief untouched. The two coexist inside the same mature believers, which is the pattern the religious-identification analysis found among born-again respondents and which the regression work identified as the engine of conversion posture.




Figure 15. Four lit-review domains by SALT spiritual stage. Covenant and regard rise with maturity; coded tropes fall then plateau; rejection theology does not move.

Conversion posture climbs most steeply of anything in the study. Agreement that Christians should share the Gospel with Jewish people so they can become Christians rises from 2.79 at P1 to 3.33 at P2 to 3.89 at P3/P4 (η^2 = .104, the largest stage effect measured). Its mirror item, that Jewish people don't need to convert because they are God's chosen people, falls from 3.13 to 3.00 to 2.70. Prophecy-shaped views of Israel rise from 2.75 to 3.63 (η^2 = .068, medium). Given that rejection theology is flat across stages, the rise in conversion posture among mature believers cannot be attributed to rising supersessionism. It is rising alongside covenant, which suggests that for mature believers evangelism of Jewish people is held as an expression of the covenant rather

than a denial of it. That is a different theological position from the one the rejection-driven regression describes, and the instrument currently cannot tell the two apart.

Historical reckoning splits. The abstract reckoning items rise modestly with maturity: understanding the history of Christian antisemitism (3.59 to 3.83), looking critically at Christian history (3.56 to 3.89), remembering historical injustice as part of faithful witness (3.51 to 3.82), and a biblical responsibility to oppose anti-Jewish prejudice (3.26 to 3.76). But the one concrete item, that the Christian church should honestly acknowledge its role in the historical mistreatment of Jewish people, is flat: 3.49, 3.42, 3.49 (η^2 = .001). Mature believers are more willing than anyone to say history matters. They are no more willing than non-believers to say the Church should own its part in it.




Figure 16. Conversion posture and prophecy-shaped views of Israel climb steeply with spiritual stage; the concrete reckoning item does not move.

Pro-Israel sentiment rises; separation does not. Israel's right to exist as a sovereign nation (3.67 to 4.21) and as a Jewish homeland (3.68 to 4.20), comfort with open Israel supporters (3.41 to 4.05), and justified self-defense after October 7 (3.11 to 3.62) all rise with stage; genocide (3.30 to 2.91) and denial of Palestinian self-government (3.38 to 2.93) fall. All are small effects. The ability to separate views of Jewish people from the Israeli government is identical across stages (3.77, 3.80, 3.81), and so is the reversed item on Israel's actions making negative views of Jewish people understandable (3.13, 3.11, 3.12). Maturity moves people toward Israel. It does not change how well they keep Israel and Jewish people apart in their minds.

Church climate and Christian sources rise. Reports that Jewish people are spoken of with respect in one's churches rise from 3.46 to 3.95, and reliance on sermons, Bible teaching and Christian media as the main source of knowledge about Jewish people rises from 2.84 to 3.46. For

the mature group the pulpit is the primary source, which puts the flat rejection-theology numbers squarely on the teaching.

Item	P1	P2	P3/P4	Total	Effect
God has an ongoing covenant or special purpose for the Jewish people	3.29	3.73	4.02	3.45	medium (.065)
God promised the present land of Israel to the Jewish people	3.14	3.55	3.86	3.29	medium (.059)
I am comfortable spending time with Jewish people	3.93	4.11	4.24	3.99	small (.014)
Jewish people can be trusted just as much as other cultures in business	3.79	3.92	4.09	3.85	small (.010)
Israel and its supporters are a bad influence on our democracy	2.88	2.53	2.44	2.77	small (.022)
Israel can get away with anything because its supporters control the media	2.80	2.44	2.53	2.71	small (.016)
Compared to other groups, Jewish people have too much power in the media	2.80	2.59	2.66	2.75	none (.005)
Because the Jewish people rejected Jesus, God has rejected them	2.40	2.18	2.32	2.35	none (.005)
The Church has replaced Israel in God's plan	2.77	2.69	2.82	2.76	none (.001)
Jewish people today bear responsibility for the death of Jesus	2.49	2.41	2.64	2.49	none (.003)
Christians should share the Gospel with Jewish people so they can become Christians	2.79	3.33	3.89	3.01	medium (.104)
Jewish people don't need to convert because they are God's chosen people	3.13	3.00	2.70	3.06	small (.018)
My view of Israel is shaped more by biblical prophecy than by current events	2.75	3.23	3.63	2.93	medium (.068)
Understanding the history of Christian antisemitism is important for Christians today	3.59	3.76	3.83	3.65	none (.009)
The Christian church should honestly acknowledge its role in the historical mistreatment of Jewish people	3.49	3.42	3.49	3.48	none (.001)
Christians have a biblical responsibility to oppose anti-Jewish prejudice	3.26	3.47	3.76	3.35	small (.023)
I can separate my view of Jewish people from my view of the modern Israeli government	3.77	3.80	3.81	3.78	none (.000)
Israel's military response in Gaza after October 7, 2023 was justified self-defense	3.11	3.47	3.62	3.23	small (.028)
Israel's actions in Gaza constitute genocide	3.30	2.95	2.91	3.20	small (.019)
Most of what I know about Jewish people comes from sermons, Bible teaching, or Christian media	2.84	3.23	3.46	2.98	small (.038)

Table. Selected items by SALT spiritual stage, unweighted means on 1–5 scales. Effect is eta-squared from group means and SDs.

What this section settles and what it does not. The hypothesis is supported on covenant and regard, weakly supported on coded tropes, and not supported on rejection theology or concrete reckoning. Scripture engagement makes believers warmer toward Jewish people and higher on the

covenant. It does not, by itself, dislodge the belief that God has rejected them, and the most mature believers are as likely as anyone to hold both at once. For a ministry built on Scripture absorption, that is the finding to sit with. The remedy the lit review hoped for is real but incomplete. More Bible produces more covenant. It does not automatically produce less supersessionism, which means the teaching itself, not just the dosage, is what has to change.

Limitations

Cross-sectional design. Every relationship reported here is correlational. The regression models identify predictors, not causes. Historical reckoning may cause recognition of antisemitism, or both may flow from a third disposition such as general openness to self-criticism. Only panel or experimental designs can separate these.

Online panel sampling. Online panels under-represent adults with low internet use and over-represent people willing to complete surveys for incentives. Stratification by age and gender and post-stratification weighting correct the marginals but not the self-selection within cells. The education distribution, with 42% holding a bachelor's degree or higher, is above the U.S. adult population, which should be kept in mind when generalizing.

Self-report on a sensitive topic. Antisemitism carries strong social-desirability pressure. Stereotype endorsement is almost certainly under-reported, which means the moderate rejection score of 3.25 is a floor, not a ceiling. Everyday regard, by contrast, is the kind of item that invites favorable self-presentation, so the 3.84 mean may be inflated. The gap between the two scales may be wider in reality than in the data.

Single-item outcomes. Two of the three modeled outcomes, seriousness in the U.S. and seriousness in evangelical circles, are single items. Single items carry more measurement error than scales, which attenuates correlations and depresses R^2. The modest R^2 values on those two models partly reflect this and should not be read as evidence that the predictors are weak.

Perceptual, not behavioral, measures of antisemitism in the Church. The study asks respondents how serious they think antisemitism is in evangelical circles. It does not measure antisemitic behavior or incidents in those circles. The 39% figure is a perception held mostly by non-evangelicals, and the 23% don't-know rate confirms that many respondents are guessing. A direct measure would require an evangelical oversample with items on observed conduct.

Religious classification by self-identification. Born-again, Christian, other religion, spiritual-not-religious and not-religious are self-labels. Denominational data were collected but the five-group analysis does not use them, so a Catholic who identifies as born-again sits in the born-again group alongside a non-denominational evangelical. Denominational and attendance-based subgroup analysis is a natural next step.

Effect sizes versus significance. With n near 3,900, trivial differences reach statistical significance. The paper reports effect sizes and treats only medium and large effects as meaningful, but readers should resist the temptation to read every significant group difference in the tables as substantive. Most are small.

Psychometric validation is incomplete. This is the first field administration of these scales. Internal consistency was acceptable for the multi-item constructs, but the full validation standard set out in the lit review, including test-retest stability, confirmatory factor analysis of the domain structure, convergent and discriminant validity against established antisemitism and xenophobia measures, and measurement invariance across denomination and age, has not yet been established. Until it is, the scale scores should be read as reliable summaries of these items, not as validated measures of the latent domains.

Partial Scripture-engagement linkage. The lit review's central hypothesis is that Scripture absorption predicts higher covenantal affirmation and everyday regard and lower trope susceptibility. This survey carried enough SALT items to classify respondents into spiritual growth stages, and Findings 8 reports the results, but it did not carry the frequency-of-engagement item that defines the Power of 4 threshold, so stage stands in for engagement. Stage is a composite of belief, practice and confidence, and P1 includes non-believers, so stage differences partly reflect Christian identification itself rather than engagement among Christians. P3 and P4 were combined because of cell size (n = 459), which hides any difference between mature believers and active disciple-makers. Stage means are unweighted. The direct test of the Power of 4, engagement frequency within believers only, awaits a joint administration with the full SALT Index.

Timing. The survey fielded while the Gaza conflict and its aftermath dominated news coverage of Israel and Jewish people. Exposure items, Israel policy items and the genocide item are time-sensitive, and the correlations among them may not hold in a different news environment.

PART II

The Lit Review

Measure What Matters: Antisemitism, the Evangelical Record, and the Case for a New Instrument on Christian Attitudes Toward the Jewish People

A combined literature review synthesizing 21 peer-reviewed sources across three research streams. Center for Scripture Absorption, June 2026.

This review preceded and informed the survey reported in Part I. It is presented on its own so that the literature and the primary evidence are not confused; Part III compares the two.

Lit Review: Executive Summary

Here is the problem in one sentence. We cannot heal what we will not measure, and the American Church has never honestly measured how it thinks about the Jewish people.

This review pulls together three bodies of research that usually sit in separate rooms. One asks what antisemitism actually does to the Jewish people who live through it. One asks how American evangelical organizations have handled antisemitism over the last half century, the good and the ugly. One asks whether we even own the tools to measure attitudes toward Jews, Israel, and antisemitism with any precision. Read together, twenty-one peer-reviewed sources point to one conclusion: the need is urgent, the evangelical record is genuinely mixed, and no existing instrument is built for the job we now face.

The harm is real and it is measurable. Across nine studies, antisemitic experience tracks consistently with depression, anxiety, stress, and PTSD. Jewish university students exposed to antisemitism posted a mean anxiety score squarely in the severe range. After October 7, 2023, depression and anxiety rose measurably among Jewish adults. The effect sizes are modest in any single study, but the direction never wavers, and the damage spreads beyond the people directly targeted to everyone watching.

The evangelical record cuts both ways, and we should say so plainly. Christian Zionism has produced real, durable support for Israel and a high view of the Jewish people's biblical significance, what one scholar called a "second patriotism." That is a genuine good. But the same movement has also carried a conversion-only posture that treats Jewish faith as incomplete, a fresh strain of coded "anti-globalist" rhetoric that recycles old conspiracy tropes while denying it is doing so, and a reluctance to examine our own theology in light of history. Pro-Israel conviction does not, by itself, immunize a congregation against antisemitism.

And we are flying blind. Of the instruments that try to measure these attitudes, every one is missing pieces. Reliability is strong where it is reported. But test-retest stability is absent across the board, confirmatory factor structure is thin, and not one instrument has been tested for measurement invariance across the groups we actually care about. None was designed for the evangelical context, to tell the difference between biblical love of Israel and inherited prejudice wearing a Sunday suit.

That is the gap this review is meant to close. The final section lays out a blueprint for a new, psychometrically serious instrument, one that measures Christian attitudes toward the Jewish people across distinct domains, distinguishes covenantal affirmation from coded contempt, and ties those attitudes back to the one variable we know how to move: Scripture engagement. If the Power of 4 holds here as it holds elsewhere, then the people most deeply in the Word should look the least like the prejudice. We intend to find out.

Lit Review: Key Takeaways

1. **The harm is consistent.** Antisemitic experience is reliably associated with worse mental health (depression, anxiety, stress, and PTSD) across every study that measured it.

2. **Perception spreads the damage.** Concern about antisemitism has climbed faster than personal incidents, and most affected students were bystanders, not direct targets. A hostile climate wounds the whole community.
3. **Identity is a double-edged sword.** Strong Jewish identity can deepen the sting of discrimination and, in other settings, buffer against it. There is no single rule.
4. **The evangelical record is mixed, not innocent and not condemned.** Genuine pro-Israel conviction coexists with conversion-only theology, coded anti-globalist tropes, and resistance to self-examination.
5. **Loving Israel is not the same as loving Jews.** Support for the State of Israel can sit right beside less favorable everyday attitudes toward Jewish people, and antisemitism statistically resembles xenophobia more than racial prejudice.
6. **No instrument is complete.** Existing measures show strong reliability but lack test-retest data, confirmatory factor structure, and invariance testing, and none was built for the Church.
7. **We can build a better one.** The path is clear: a multi-domain, IHRA-grounded instrument, validated to a full psychometric standard, linked to Scripture engagement. That is our next deliverable.

Why This Matters: The Mental-Health Cost of Antisemitism

Before we argue about theology or methodology, we should sit with the human stakes. Nine peer-reviewed studies, published between 2011 and 2025, examined what antisemitic experience does to Jewish Americans. The verdict is not subtle.

The pattern holds across every outcome. Depression, anxiety, stress, PTSD: every domain studied shows the same direction. Greater exposure to, or perception of, antisemitism lines up with worse mental health. Two studies tracked Jewish adults and students across October 7, 2023, and found measurable increases in depression and anxiety afterward, with perceptions of antisemitism partly explaining the change. A longitudinal study of students found that within-person spikes in antisemitism-related stress predicted spikes in depressive symptoms the same week. Jewish university students exposed to antisemitism scored a mean of 15.45 on the GAD-7, squarely in the severe-anxiety band.

Exposure is common, and worry outruns the headlines. Among Jewish university students, 57% reported experiencing antisemitism directly and 63% witnessed it as bystanders. Yet across a separate multi-year sample of young adults, personal harassment held relatively steady even through high-profile attacks, while concern about antisemitism in America climbed sharply. The lesson for us is important: the wound is not only what happens to you. It is also the dawning sense that the room has turned against your people.

How big are the effects? Honesty requires a caveat. In any single study, the measured effect is modest. Antisemitism-related stress added roughly 2–6% of explained variance in depressive symptoms. The interaction of perceived discrimination with ethnic identity explained R^2 values of about .07–.09. That is normal for this kind of research; distress is usually the sum of many stressors, not one. But modest per study and trivial are not the same thing. When the same modest signal appears in every study, pointing the same way, you stop calling it noise.

Study	Outcome	Key finding	Magnitude
Hibel et al. (2025)	Depression, anxiety, stress	Significant rise after October 7, 2023	Not reported
Morstead et al. (2025)	Depression (CESD-10)	Antisemitism-stress spikes track depression	+2–6% variance
Weisskirch et al. (2016)	Depression (CES-D)	Discrimination predicts depression; amplified by identity	≈3.1 pts; R^2 .07–.09
Waldman-Levi et al. (2025)	Anxiety (GAD-7)	Mean score in severe range	M = 15.45
Nesterko et al. (2025)	Distress, PTSD	Antisemitism linked to higher distress and probable PTSD	Not reported
Wohl et al. (2011)	PTSD (Holocaust)	Identity buffers non-descendants, heightens risk for descendants	Direction varies

Table. Selected mental-health findings linking antisemitic experience to clinical outcomes.

What changes the size of the wound. Three moderators kept surfacing, and all three matter for what we build next. Jewish identity is the strangest: stronger ethnic-identity searching amplified the depression that followed discrimination, while in another context collective identification buffered PTSD. Coping style mattered; leaning into support helped, avoidance hurt. And family communication about historical trauma shaped how the Holocaust's long shadow landed on the second and third generations. Identity, coping, and conversation: these are not academic footnotes. They are the levers.

The Evangelical Record: Addressed and Perpetuated

Now the harder mirror. Five sources examined how American evangelical organizations have engaged antisemitism since 1974. I will not soften what they found, and I will not exaggerate it. The record is mixed. We have done real good and real harm, sometimes in the same breath.

One honesty note up front: every one of these five sources was available only in abstract, and none named specific organizations, budgets, or leaders. So we are reading the shape of the problem, not its fingerprints. That limitation is itself an argument for the primary research this review is building toward. Of the five sources, two documented evangelical efforts that combated antisemitism, two were mixed, and one documented perpetuation.

The good: a genuine, deep-rooted love for Israel. This is not a recent political fashion. Fundamentalist support for Zionism runs back to 1878–1918, decades before the modern state existed. One historian described evangelical loyalty to Israel as a "second patriotism." Rooted in eschatology and a high view of God's covenant with the Jewish people, this conviction has made evangelicals among Israel's most reliable friends. We should own that with gratitude, not embarrassment.

The hard part: pro-Israel is not the same as pro-Jewish. Here is where we have to be grown-ups. Survey research on the Religious Right found something uncomfortable: stronger-than-average support for the Jewish people's special biblical status, sitting right alongside less favorable attitudes on everyday social and economic questions, and strong support for the idea that Jews need to be converted to Christianity. You can cheer for the State of Israel on Sunday and hold a quietly diminished view of your Jewish neighbor on Monday. The data say both can be true at once.

Source	What was found	Response type	Theological driver
Rausch (1983)	Early fundamentalist support for Zionism (1878–1918)	Combated	Christian Zionism
Merkley (2001)	Loyalty to Israel as a "second patriotism"	Combated	Eschatology / restoration
Smith (1999)	Pro-Israel yet less favorable social views; pro-conversion	Mixed	Conversion theology
Ney (2016)	Biblical-authority commitments limit doctrinal self-examination	Mixed	View of Scripture as revelation
O'Donnell (2020)	Coded antisemitism via anti-globalist / Soros tropes	Perpetuated	Zionism fused with anti-globalism

Table. The spectrum of evangelical engagement, from active opposition to structural perpetuation.

The new strain: antisemitism "under erasure." The most recent and most troubling finding concerns coded antisemitism. In the post-2016 era, Christian Zionist rhetoric began fusing with anti-globalist conspiracy narratives, the recycled figure of the shadowy financier, the Soros boogeyman, that lean on classic antisemitic tropes while loudly denying any such thing. The scholarship calls it antisemitism "under erasure": the trope is structurally necessary to the story and

simultaneously disavowed. It is possible to wave an Israeli flag and traffic in the oldest slander against Jews at the same time. That should stop us cold.

The blind spot: a theology that struggles to look back. Finally, our deep commitment to Scripture as objective revelation, which I share without apology, can harden into a reluctance to re-examine inherited theology in light of the Holocaust. One analysis noted how the celebration of Christian rescuers can quietly function to deflect the harder question of Christian complicity. A high view of the Bible is a gift. Using it to avoid honest self-inventory is not.

Can We Even Measure This? The State of the Instruments

So the harm is real and the Church's record needs honest examination. Both point to the same practical question: do we have a ruler? Eight sources evaluated the instruments that try to measure attitudes toward Jews, Israel, and antisemitism. The short answer is that we have good pieces and no finished tool.

Reliability: strong where it shows up. The numbers, where reported, are reassuring. The Antizionist Antisemitism scale posted an alpha of 0.85. Its parent Generalised Antisemitism scale reached a lambda-6 of 0.90. The Katz–Francis attitude-toward-Judaism scale hit 0.97, and that is almost too good, high enough to suggest the items may be saying the same thing twenty-four different ways. Reliability is the one box most of these instruments check.

Validity: uneven, and one instructive finding. Validity is where the picture frays. Some instruments offer careful content-validity work; some lean on exploratory factor analysis; few offer convergent or discriminant evidence against outside measures. One study stands out for what it teaches us: using a U.S. sample, it found that antisemitism shares more statistical variance with xenophobia than with anti-Black prejudice, and that it strongly predicts both QAnon support and 2020 Trump vote intention. Translation: antisemitism behaves less like racism and more like a fear of the outsider, the disloyal, the "globalist." That is a design clue we cannot ignore. It tells us which neighboring constructs our own instrument must distinguish itself from.

The real problem: nobody has the whole profile. Put the instruments side by side against the six things a serious measure needs, and the gap is impossible to miss. Internal consistency is well covered. After that, the wall. Test-retest stability, the proof that a score means the same thing in March that it meant in February, is absent from every single instrument reviewed. Confirmatory factor structure is thin or deferred to papers no one can see. Measurement invariance, the test of whether the instrument means the same thing to a 70-year-old Baptist and a 25-year-old Pentecostal, has never been established for any of them.

Instrument	Items	Reliability	Validation sample	Biggest gap
ARSI (2018)	30 / 3 subscales	"Strong"	500 U.S. Jews	No test-retest
AzAs (2019)	6	α = 0.85	122 U.S. MTurk	No CFA; floor effects
GeAs (2022)	12 / 2 subscales	λ6 = 0.90	1,853 UK adults	Evidence deferred elsewhere
Levin et al. (2022)	Not stated	Not stated	U.S. weighted	Instrument under-specified
Katz–Francis (2016)	24	α = 0.97	101 Australian Jews	Possible redundancy; narrow sample

Table. The instrument families at a glance. None was built for the American evangelical context.

The Blueprint: Building a Better Instrument

This is the whole point. Three streams of research converge on one opportunity. The harm is real, so the work matters. The Church's record is mixed, so we have something worth measuring honestly. And no existing tool is built for the job, so the field is open. What follows is the blueprint for what we should build next: a working name, a domain architecture, and a validation standard we will not cut corners on.

Working name: the Christian Attitudes Toward the Jewish People (CATJP) Scale. Provisional, and frankly secondary to the architecture beneath it.

Five domains, because the attitude is not one thing. The single biggest lesson from Part II is that pro-Israel and pro-Jewish are not the same variable. An instrument that collapses them into one score will tell us nothing useful. So the CATJP measures five distinct domains, scored separately, so a respondent can be high on covenant and high on coded tropes at the same time, and we would see it.

Proposed domain	What it captures	Grounded in
Covenantal Affirmation	A high biblical view of God's ongoing relationship with the Jewish people and of Israel's significance	Merkley; Rausch; Smith
Everyday Regard	Warmth or coldness toward Jewish neighbors in ordinary social and economic life	Smith (the pro-Israel / less-favorable gap)
Coded-Trope Susceptibility	Agreement with "globalist," dual-loyalty, and financier-conspiracy framings	O'Donnell; Levin (xenophobia link)
Conversion Posture	Whether the Jewish people are seen as incomplete absent conversion, vs. relational respect	Smith (conversion theology)
Scripture engagement (the Power of 4) should predict higher covenantal affirmation and everyday regard and lower trope susceptibility.	By SALT spiritual stage: covenant rises 3.29 to 4.02 (medium), every regard item rises (small), coded tropes fall then plateau (small to none). Rejection theology is flat across stages (2.40, 2.18, 2.32) and so is agreement that the Church should acknowledge its historical role.	Supported on covenant and regard; weakly on tropes; not supported on rejection theology. Stage is a proxy; the frequency test is still open

Table. Proposed CATJP domain architecture.

A validation standard we will actually finish. The instrument review is a catalogue of unfinished homework. We will not repeat it. The CATJP will be held to the full profile no reviewed instrument completed, every box, not just the easy one.

- **Anchor the definition.** Build items against the IHRA working definition, as the strongest reviewed instrument did, so "antisemitism" is not left to taste.
- **Internal consistency, without redundancy.** Target α/ω in the .80–.90 band per domain: reliable, but not the bloated .97 that signals the same item asked twenty ways.
- **Test-retest stability.** The universal gap. Build in a two-to-four-week retest from day one. This is non-negotiable.
- **Confirmatory factor analysis.** Confirm the five-domain structure with reported fit indices, not just exploratory hand-waving.

- **Convergent and discriminant validity.** Show the CATJP correlates with established antisemitism measures and separates cleanly from xenophobia and general religiosity, the exact neighbors the literature flagged.
- **Measurement invariance.** Prove the instrument means the same thing across denomination, age, region, and Scripture-engagement level before we compare those groups.
- **Guard against floor effects.** Write items that discriminate at the upper range, learning from the pilot that clustered below its own midpoint.

The CSA difference: tie it to Scripture engagement. Here is what no one else in this literature can do, and what makes this ours. We already measure Scripture absorption at scale through the SALT Index. So we will not stop at a snapshot of attitudes. We will ask the question the whole field has left on the table: does deeper, more frequent engagement with the actual text of Scripture move these attitudes, and in which direction?

My hypothesis, stated plainly so the data can prove me wrong: the people who cross the Power of 4 threshold, engaging Scripture four or more days a week, will score higher on Covenantal Affirmation and Everyday Regard and lower on Coded-Trope Susceptibility. If that holds, it reframes the entire conversation. Antisemitism in the Church becomes not a fixed feature of conviction but a symptom of malnourishment, and the remedy is the very thing we exist to encourage. If it does not hold, we need to know that even more.

Where this goes. The deliverable from here is concrete: a draft item bank across the five domains, an expert content-validity review, a pilot of roughly 300 respondents to clean items and check structure, and then a full validation sample large enough to run confirmatory factor analysis and invariance testing. The studies reviewed would have told us to plan for well over a thousand. Run alongside the SALT Index, the CATJP becomes the first instrument designed to measure how the American Church actually regards the Jewish people, and whether the Word itself bends those attitudes toward love.

We have spent this review proving we cannot heal what we will not measure. The next step is to pick up the ruler and build it right.

PART III

Conclusion

What the literature predicted, and what the survey found

Conclusion: The Lit Review Against the Findings

The lit review made seven claims and proposed five domains before a single respondent was surveyed. The survey is the test. The honest scorecard is that the literature was right about the shape of the problem, wrong about one thing that matters, and silent on the questions only primary data could answer. Each claim is taken in turn, with the finding that bears on it.

Claim by claim

Lit review claim	What the survey found	Verdict
Loving Israel is not the same as loving Jews (Smith 1999). Pro-Israel conviction can coexist with less favorable everyday attitudes.	Born-again respondents are the most pro-Israel group on every legitimacy and policy item (legitimacy 3.83) and the lowest-scoring group on stereotype rejection (3.16). Everyday regard is high for all (3.83); stereotype rejection is moderate for all (3.25). The two move independently.	Confirmed
A conversion-only posture treats Jewish faith as incomplete and is a signature of the evangelical record.	Evangelism of Jewish people is the largest group difference in the study (born-again 3.71 vs. 2.39–2.97 elsewhere). The strongest predictor of that posture is the belief that God has rejected the Jewish people (R^2 = .36).	Confirmed and sharpened: the driver is rejection theology, not born-again identity alone
Coded antisemitism 'under erasure' (O'Donnell 2020): classic tropes persist alongside loud pro-Israel sentiment.	The stereotype/conspiracy scale sits only a quarter-point above neutral in the whole sample, and the most pro-Israel group scores lowest on rejecting those tropes. Born-again respondents are also slightly more willing to say Israel's actions make negative views of Jewish people understandable (2.75 on the reversed item).	Consistent; the survey did not carry explicit globalist or financier items, so the specific trope family remains untested
Evangelical theology resists self-examination in light of the Holocaust (Ney 2016).	Born-again respondents are the group most willing to say the Church should reckon with its antisemitic past (3.70) and most likely to say Christians have a biblical duty to oppose anti-Jewish prejudice (3.59). No meaningful group difference exists on either.	Not supported as stated. Stated willingness is high. But Christian identification still predicts not seeing antisemitism in the Church (β = −.126), so the blind spot shows up as under-recognition, not as refusal
Antisemitism behaves more like xenophobia than like racial prejudice (Levin et al. 2022).	Not tested. The survey did not carry xenophobia or racial-prejudice measures, so discriminant validity against those neighbors remains open.	Not tested
Antisemitic experience harms Jewish mental health, and perceived climate spreads the harm (nine studies).	The survey measures the perceiving public, not Jewish Americans. It finds that two-thirds see a serious national problem and 59% see it rising, which is the climate the literature says does the damage.	Not tested directly; the climate finding is consistent
No existing instrument is complete; test-retest, CFA and invariance are universally missing.	This survey is a first administration. Internal consistency is acceptable; test-retest, CFA and invariance are still pending, exactly as the review said would be required.	Confirmed as a gap; the gap is now ours to close
Scripture engagement (the Power of 4) should predict higher	Not tested. The survey did not carry the SALT items. Attendance and Bible-study participation	Not tested; the central hypothesis is still open

Lit review claim	What the survey found	Verdict
covenantal affirmation and everyday regard and lower trope susceptibility.	were collected and can proxy in secondary analysis.	

Table. The lit review's claims scored against the survey findings.

The five domains, one at a time

Covenantal Affirmation. The literature expected it to be high among evangelicals and it is: born-again respondents lead on God's covenant purpose (3.83) and the land promise (3.69), with medium effects. The domain exists in the data and it is where the literature said it would be.

Everyday Regard. The literature predicted a gap between covenant and regard. The survey finds the gap, but not quite where the literature put it. Everyday regard is high and flat across every group, born-again included. The gap is not between evangelicals and others on regard; it is between regard and stereotype rejection inside every group, and it is widest among born-again respondents.

Coded-Trope Susceptibility. The survey confirms moderate susceptibility across the public and the lowest rejection score among born-again respondents. It did not isolate the specific globalist and financier framings the literature flagged, so the next instrument revision should add them as a distinct subscale.

Conversion Posture. This is the domain the survey explains best, and the result refines the literature. Conversion posture is not driven by contempt. It is predicted by rejection theology, by born-again identity, by pro-Israel conviction, by conservative politics and by support for historical reckoning, and it is predicted negatively by antisemitic beliefs. The people who most want to evangelize Jewish people are not the people who think least of them. That nuance was not in the literature and it changes how the Church should talk about it.

Historical Reckoning. Here the survey corrects the literature. The review, drawing on Ney (2016), predicted resistance to self-examination. The survey finds the opposite at the level of stated belief: willingness to reckon is high everywhere and highest among born-again Christians, and it is the one predictor that raises recognition of antisemitism in every model. The problem is not refusal. It is that stated willingness has not yet translated into recognition inside the Church, where Christian identification still predicts seeing less of a problem.

Where the two bodies of evidence leave us

Three conclusions follow from reading the literature and the survey together.

First, the literature's central distinction holds. Pro-Israel and pro-Jewish are different variables, and an instrument that collapses them would have missed the most important finding in the survey. The five-domain architecture is vindicated by the data and should be kept.

Second, the literature was too pessimistic about the Church's willingness to look at its past and too vague about what actually drives conversion posture. The survey replaces 'resistance to self-examination' with 'under-recognition despite stated willingness,' and it replaces 'conversion-only

theology' with a specific, measurable driver: belief that God has rejected the Jewish people. Both corrections point to the same lever. Teach the covenant faithfully and the rejection belief that powers conversion posture loses its footing, while the reckoning disposition that already exists gets something concrete to act on.

Third, of the two questions the literature cared most about, one is now half answered and one is still open. Does Scripture engagement bend these attitudes toward love? On regard and covenant, yes: the most mature believers in the sample are the warmest toward Jewish people and hold the highest view of God's covenant with them. On supersessionism, no: belief that God has rejected the Jewish people is as common among disciple-makers as among non-believers, and it is that belief, not maturity, that drives conversion posture. The ruler the literature said was missing has now been used once, and it found that the Word raises the covenant without lowering the contradiction that sits beside it. Whether antisemitism in the Church behaves like xenophobia, as Levin found in the general public, remains untested. The next administration, run with the frequency item that defines the Power of 4 and against the discriminant measures the literature named, is where both questions get settled.

We said in the review that we cannot heal what we will not measure. We have now measured. The Church's heart toward the Jewish people is warmer than its critics assume and less free of old ideas than it believes about itself. That is a diagnosis the Church can act on, and it is the first one of its kind built on evidence rather than on assumption.

References

Allington, D., & Hirsh, D. (2019). The AzAs (Antizionist Antisemitism) Scale: Measuring antisemitism as expressed in relation to Israel and its supporters. *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism.* https://doi.org/10.26613/jca/2.2.32

Allington, D., Hirsh, D., & Katz, L. (2022). The Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) Scale. *Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism.* https://doi.org/10.26613/jca/5.1.99

Allington, D., Hirsh, D., & Katz, L. (n.d.). The Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) Scale: Validity and factor structure.

Francis, L., & Katz, Y. (2007). Measuring attitude toward Judaism: The internal consistency reliability of the Katz–Francis Scale. https://doi.org/10.1080/13694670600668291

Hibel, L. C., Sigal, M., & Teff-Seker, Y. (2025). Mental health in Californian Jews before and after October 7, 2023. *Psychological Trauma.* https://doi.org/10.1037/tra0002011

Johns, A. N., Brown, L. S., & Cromer, L. (2022). Examining intergenerational transmission of Holocaust trauma. *Journal of Traumatic Stress.* https://doi.org/10.1002/jts.22856

Levin, I., Filindra, A., & Kopstein, J. (2022). Validating and testing a measure of antisemitism on support for QAnon and vote intention for Trump in 2020. *Social Science Quarterly.* https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13155

Lumbroso, P., Fayn, K., Tiliopoulos, N., & Francis, L. (2016). The internal consistency reliability of the Katz–Francis Scale among Australian Jews. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel7100123

Merkley, P. C. (2001). Christian attitudes towards the state of Israel.

Morstead, T., & DeLongis, A. (2025). Antisemitism on campus in the wake of October 7. *Stress and Health.* https://doi.org/10.1002/smi.3529

Nesterko, Y., Specht, F., Stammel, N., et al. (2025). Mental health and experiences of antisemitism in 2nd and 3rd offspring generations of Holocaust survivors. *International Journal of Psychology.* https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.70053

Ney, A. (2016). North American evangelical Christian responses to the Holocaust. https://doi.org/10.13016/M2TQ70

O'Donnell, S. (2020). Antisemitism under erasure: Christian Zionist anti-globalism and the refusal of cohabitation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies.* https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1704042

Rausch, D. (1983). Zionism within early American fundamentalism, 1878–1918.

Rosen, D. C., Kuczynski, A. M., & Kanter, J. W. (2018). The Antisemitism-Related Stress Inventory: Development and preliminary psychometric evaluation. *Psychology of Violence.* https://doi.org/10.1037/vio0000208

Smith, T. W. (1999). The Religious Right and anti-Semitism. *Review of Religious Research.* https://doi.org/10.2307/3512370

Waldman-Levi, A., Friedman, Z. L., Falk-Kessler, J., et al. (2025). Jewish students' experiences of antisemitism in higher education and daily occupations. *OTJR.* https://doi.org/10.1177/15394492251344525

Weisskirch, R. S., Kim, S. Y., Schwartz, S., & Whitbourne, S. (2016). The complexity of ethnic identity among Jewish American emerging adults. *Identity.* https://doi.org/10.1080/15283488.2016.1190724

Wohl, M. J. A., & Van Bavel, J. (2011). Is identifying with a historically victimized group good or bad for your health? https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.844

Wright, G., Volodarsky, S., Hecht, S., & Saxe, L. (2021). Trends in Jewish young adult experiences and perceptions of antisemitism in America, 2017–2019. *Contemporary Jewry.* https://doi.org/10.1007/s12397-021-09354-6

Yablon, Y. B., Francis, L., & Robbins, M. (2013). The Katz–Francis Scale of Attitude toward Judaism: Internal consistency reliability and construct validity. *Pastoral Psychology.* https://doi.org/10.1007/s11089-013-0523-y